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ABSTRACT
International environmental standards are rapidly changing,
prompting states to reevaluate the sustainability of their
developmental policies, including the negative effects that free trade
agreements and investment treaties can have on the environment.
This Article explores the tensions between international investment
law and international environmental law that prompt investors to
bring claims to international courts and arbitral tribunals alleging
that their rights have been violated. It discusses how arbitral
tribunals evaluate investor claims and how they assess the
legitimacy of governmental environmental protective measures.
The Article then examines ways in which states can increase the
likelihood that tribunals are sensitive to the need for environmental
conservation and defer to state decision-making.
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INTRODUCTION
Increasing globalization of economic activities through both
trade and investment has contributed to rising GDP, improved
standards of living, and general economic development in many
parts of the world. And while these advancements are positive, they
do not come without costs, especially environmental ones. As
consensus emerges about the negative impact of human activity
leading to environmental degradation, states are increasingly
prioritizing environmental protection and sustainable development.
States are beginning to cooperate on climate change issues as well,
incorporating provisions that integrate environmental concerns in
free trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties (BITs).
International courts and arbitral tribunals are following the same
trend, and are starting to weigh environmental concerns more
heavily when deciding the scope of a state’s regulatory sphere in
investment arbitrations.
Incorporating environmental provisions into BITs can prove
disadvantageous to investors, however, thus prompting them to
bring arbitral claims in hopes of securing more preferential
treatment or compensation for their losses. A growing number of
investor claims based on losses suffered due to environmental
regulations has “raised concerns that [ . . . ] large compensation bills
might unduly constrain regulatory space.”1 Given these tensions
between individual investors and the environmental goals of host
states, arbitral tribunals must carefully balance interests.
An important avenue for arbitral tribunals to justify deference to
states’ environmental regulations is through treaty interpretation.
Favorable treaty interpretation can help shield host states from
claims based on violations of fair and equitable treatment or
expropriation, and can ensure that states have the space to regulate
based on both domestic environmental needs and their international
commitments.
Important questions remain, however.
How do arbitral
tribunals evaluate the legitimacy of governmental regulations
purported to prioritize environmental and human health? And how
much deference should tribunals accord, even when these measures
are legitimate? In drafting BITs, states can help extend the deference
1
Lorenzo Cotula, Expropriation Clauses and Environmental Regulation: Diffusion
of Law in the Era of Investment Treaties, 24 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L.
278, 287 (2015).
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offered by tribunals by modeling provisions on those commonly
included in free trade agreements and by looking towards other
international courts to borrow their justifications for evolutionary
treaty interpretation.2 This Article will review the role preambular
provisions and explicit exceptions play in both trade and investment
matters. It will examine the investor treatment standards of fair and
equitable treatment and expropriation to analyze how and under
what circumstances arbitral tribunals are most likely to defer to
states and their policy-making in investment cases.
Part 1 will discuss treaty interpretation as codified in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, building the foundation for the
application of treaty interpretation discussed throughout the paper.
Part 2 examines trade disputes as they relate to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In this section, the Article
focuses on the way the GATT’s preambular provisions helped the
Tribunal in the Shrimp/Turtle Dispute navigate the interpretation of
the exceptions enshrined under GATT Article XX(g), and looks at
the way in which current environmental and legal standards not yet
formally enshrined in text can be incorporated into decisionmaking, as seen in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case. Part 3 then moves
on to Bilateral Investment Treaties and first reviews BITs’
preambular provisions before summarizing explicit exceptions and
carve outs. Part 4 reviews standards of international law that are
most applicable to investment disputes, namely the standard of fair
and equitable treatment and expropriation, and includes discussion
of notable cases. Part 5 analyzes how tribunals should—and do—
assess fair and equitable treatment and expropriation claims, and
provides recommendations to ensure that tribunals reach decisions
that are sensitive to environmental measures.

2
In dispute resolution relating to treaties or agreements, courts and tribunals
must often decide whether the meaning of terms enshrined in the documents in
question can evolve over time or whether they retain the same meaning regardless
of the changing socio-political context. Evolutionary treaty interpretation favors
the former approach: it involves applying modern conceptions of a term’s meaning,
understood at the time of the dispute, instead of applying the understanding of the
terms held at the time of the treaty’s inception. See Joost Pauwelyn & Manfred Elsig,
The Politics of Treaty Interpretation: Variations and Explanations Across International
Tribunals, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 445, 453 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark
A. Pollack eds., 2013) (stating that temporal considerations play a large role in
determining the meaning behind a term).
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1. TREATY INTERPRETATION AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF TREATIES
Investment treaties are not entered into in vacuums; thus, it is
important to recognize that while these treaties are aimed at
attracting foreign investment by offering attractive protections and
incentives to investors, host states must remain cognizant of their
other international legal obligations.3 Since many BITs do not
contain specific provisions relating to environmental conservation
or those provisions, if they do exist, are sparse and largely
unhelpful, tribunals can turn to treaty interpretation to broaden
their scope.4 In these instances, tribunals turn to the rules of treaty
interpretation codified in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. Tribunals must interpret treaties “in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.”5
The Vienna Convention specifies that context for the purpose of
treaty interpretation includes: any additional agreements made
between the parties, subsequent agreements, State practice, other
relevant rules of international law in force between the parties, and
intent.6 The Vienna Convention also provides for supplementary
means of interpretation, which include “the preparatory work of the
treaty and circumstances of its conclusion.”7
2. TRADE AND THE GATT
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a
multilateral trade agreement, entered into force in 1948 as a
mechanism to increase international trade between member states
by reducing or eliminating barriers to trade.8 In the decades since
3
Rahim Moloo & Justin Jacinto, Environmental and Health Regulation: Assessing
Liability under Investment Treaties, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2011).
4
Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Environmental Protection and Investment
Arbitration: Yin and Yang?, ANUARIO COLOMBIANO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 371,
374 (2017).
5
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 155
U.N.T.S. 331.
6 Id. art. 31.
7 Id. art. 32.
8
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Preamble, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
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the agreement’s conception, however, tensions have risen between
liberalized trade and environmental protection, prompting disputes
between member states. Many of these disputes are resolved in
arbitral tribunals or courts, which often look to preambular
provisions enshrined in agreements and to current standards in
environmental management and conservation to determine whether
measures could be justified under exceptions to the agreement.
2.1. Preambular provisions
Arbitral tribunals commonly turn to preambles to help reveal
the object and purpose of a treaty and to guide the interpretation of
substantive provisions, especially in disputes regarding free trade
agreements. One notable example of preambular provisions
informing a decision from an arbitral tribunal is the Shrimp-Turtle
Dispute. In this case, the United States passed regulations requiring
the use of Turtle Excluder Devices (TEDs) in all areas where there
was a likelihood that shrimp would interact with sea turtles.9 These
regulations resulted in an import ban on all shrimp and shrimp
products from countries where shrimp was harvested using
commercial technology that could adversely affect sea turtles.10 The
regulations provided, however, that this ban would not apply to
countries that were certified.11 India, Pakistan, Thailand, and
Malaysia argued that these laws violated WTO rules because the
import ban constituted “unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail[ed].”12 The tribunal
considered whether Article XX(g) of the GATT, which states that
9
Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, para. 2, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998)
[hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle Dispute].
10 Id. para. 3.
11
Certification would be granted to countries whose fishing environments
posed no threats to sea turtles. First, countries would be certified given the absence
of the relevant species of sea turtles in their waters. Second, certification would be
granted if countries harvested shrimp exclusively in ways that posed no threat to
sea turtles, such as artisanal ways. And third, countries would be certified if they
harvested shrimp in waters that had no sea turtles at all. Certification would also
be granted to countries who fell outside of the aforementioned parameters, but
“that provide[d] documentary evidence of the adoption of a regulatory program
governing the incidental taking of sea turtles . . . that [was] comparable to the
United States program and where the average rate of incidental taking of sea turtles
by their vessels [was] comparable to that of United States vessels.” Id. para. 3–4.
12 Id. para. 10.
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countries can be exempted from GATT rules if the measures
undertaken relate to “the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources,”13 was applicable, and turned to preambular provisions
to instruct its determination. In interpreting the term “exhaustible
natural resources,” the tribunal explained that:
The words of Article XX(g), “exhaustible natural resources”,
were actually crafted more than 50 years ago. They must be
read by a treaty interpreter in the light of contemporary
concerns of the community of nations about the protection
and conservation of the environment. While Article XX was
not modified in the Uruguay Round, the preamble attached
to the WTO Agreement shows that the signatories to that
Agreement were, in 1994, fully aware of the importance and
legitimacy of environmental protection as a goal of national
and international policy. The preamble of the WTO
Agreement—which informs not only the GATT 1994, but also
the other covered agreements—explicitly acknowledges “the
objective of sustainable development.”14
The arbitral tribunal explained that the term “exhaustible
natural resources” is not static, but indeed evolutionary,15 and found
that sea turtles can be categorized as exhaustible natural resources.
This determination led to the tribunal’s decision that while the U.S.
import ban did indeed fall under the purview of the exception
enshrined in Article XX(g) and under Article XX’s chapeau

13
GATT, supra note 8, art. XX(g); see also id. art. XX(b) (specifying that Parties
may take any measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health.”). Article XX’s chapeau conditions these exceptions on the guarantee that
states will “not appl[y] [the measures] in a manner that would constitute a means
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.” This requires that the measure be
taken in good faith, because the exceptions are intended to help Parties promote
their legitimate interests, not to retaliate amongst other Parties or gain an unfair
advantage. Compliance with the chapeau can be demonstrated in a variety of ways.
The accused Party can show that the measures were a result of cooperation and
agreement at the international level and that the measure was designed with
flexibility in mind, taking into account different situations in different countries.
The offending Party may also put forth an analysis showing a clear connection
between the measure and the discrimination, identifying reasonable justifications
for its reasoning. WTO rules and environmental policies: GATT exceptions, WORLD
TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envt_rules_exceptions_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/X8XW-FYAG].
14
Shrimp/Turtle Dispute, supra note 9, para. 129.
15 Id. para. 130.
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procedurally,16 it failed to fulfill the requirements substantively.17
The tribunal found that the measure was applied in a manner that
constitutes arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination in that the ban
was applied differently in “countries where the same conditions
prevail.”18
Tribunals in international investment arbitrations could
potentially borrow the approach the tribunal took in the ShrimpTurtle Dispute in deciding trade disputes relating to supposed
environmental conservation. The tribunal stressed the importance
of preambular provisions by explaining that “the specific language
of the preamble to the WTO Agreement . . . gives colour, texture and
shading to the rights and obligations of Members under the WTO
Agreement, generally, and under the GATT 1994, in particular.”19
And although the tribunal did not ultimately completely defer to the
United States in its regulatory policy-making, the Shrimp-Turtle
Dispute was nonetheless a pioneering case in that it affirmed that
“WTO Members are free to adopt their own policies aimed at
protecting the environment as long as, in so doing, they fulfill their
obligations and respect the rights of other Members under the WTO
Agreement.”20
2.2. Current Standards
International investment arbitral panels could also more readily
consider current standards in international environmental
management, policy-making, and law as opposed to standards in
effect at the time of entrance into the agreement, as do courts such
as the International Court of Justice (ICJ). A notable case in which
the ICJ applied current standards is the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case,
Id. para. 145.
Id. para. 160. In this case, the distinction between procedural and
substantive adherence to Article XX(g) is one of superficial compliance versus
compliance in application; intended versus actual effect. In the case of procedural
compliance, the Tribunal examined the ban on its face to determine whether its
general design reasonably related to the policy goal it intended to serve: protecting
sea turtles. Id. at para. 137–142. Substantively, the Tribunal was concerned that the
measure’s application did not constitute arbitrary discrimination and that it was
not a “disguised restriction on international trade” as per the conditions set out in
Article XX’s chapeau. Id. at para. 160.
18 Id. para. 184.
19 Id. para. 155.
20 Id. para. 186.
16
17
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where the Court considered the principles of prevention and
precaution,
intergenerational
equity,
and
sustainable
21
development.
In the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, Hungary and Czechoslovakia
entered into a treaty to construct a system of dams on the Danube
river.22 But after learning of the environmental risks associated with
the project’s completion and after garnering intense criticism,
Hungary suspended and then permanently abandoned the project.23
Although the Court found that Hungary violated its treaty
obligations by terminating construction,24 the Court stressed the
importance of seriously considering the project’s detrimental impact
on the environment and explained that current standards should be
applied in these considerations:25
Owing to new scientific insights and to a growing awareness
of the risks for mankind – for present and future generations
– of pursuit of such interventions at an unconsidered and
unabated pace, new norms and standards have been
developed, set forth in a great number of instruments during
the last two decades. Such new norms have to be taken into
consideration, and such new standards given proper weight,
not only when States contemplate new activities but also
when continuing with activities begun in the past. This need
to reconcile economic development with protection of the
environment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable
development.26
By discussing the importance of current standards, the Court
affirmed the living nature of treaties and their ability to evolve over
time to adapt to changing norms in international law. Therefore,
although the Court ordered Hungary to resume its treaty
obligations, it called on the parties to jointly decide on alternative
measures that would be less taxing on the environment.27 The
Court’s call to both the parties and future benches and panels to
consider current standards in their decision-making was taken
Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 4, at 375.
Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia),
1997 I.C.J., para. 15 [hereinafter Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Case].
23 Id. para. 22.
24 Id. para. 59.
25 Id. para. 140.
26 Id.
27 Id. para. 141.
21
22
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seriously in subsequent decisions. For example, in the Iron Rhine
Arbitration, the Tribunal referenced the living nature of treaties
developed in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case by noting that an
“evolutive interpretation, which would ensure an application of the
treaty that would be effective in terms of its object and purpose, will
be preferred to a strict application of the intertemporal rule.”28
Tribunals have continued the trend of interpreting treaties
according to principles of international environmental law in place
at the time of the decision in other cases as well. In the Indus Water
Kishenganga Arbitration, the Tribunal said “principles of
international environmental law must be taken into account even
when . . . interpreting treaties concluded before the development of
that body of law.”29
3. BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES
Although one could plausibly argue that environmental
considerations are not as central to investment as they are in trade,
countries are increasingly recognizing the necessity of including
conservation provisions in BITs as a way to both propel
environmental protection and broaden the scope of their regulatory
sphere in that area. Scholars such as Laurence Boisson de
Chazournes have categorized these provisions in three categories.30
The first category, provisions enshrined in preambles, function
similarly to preambular provisions in free trade agreements, in that
the commitments are expressed in general terms and are generally
not binding.31 Second, provisions can function as exceptions, such
as those found within Article XX(g) of the GATT Agreement.32
These provisions may carve out a State’s specific regulatory
powers.33 Such provisions are meant to provide States with space to
set up environmental frameworks consistent with the goals of the
BITs without the constant fear that they will be found to be in
28
Iron Rhine Railway (Kingdom of Belgium v. Kingdom of the Netherlands),
PCA Case Repository, para. 80 (2005).
29
Indus Water Kishenganga Arbitration (Pakistan v. India), Partial Award,
PCA Case Repository, para. 452 (2013).
30
Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 4, at 380.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
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violation of investment standards such as fair and equitable
treatment, expropriation, national treatment, or most favored
nation. And third, these environmental obligations may be found in
provisions that delineate investors’ rights and responsibilities.34
These obligations can include, but are not limited to, provisions on
corporate social responsibility (CSR) or requirements to submit
environmental impact assessments at specified times.35 This third
category of protection, however, is outside the scope of this paper
and will not be discussed further.
3.1. Preambular Provisions
Provisions enshrined in preambles can help tribunals decipher
the object and purpose of a treaty as codified by the treaty
interpretation rules in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT). Trends show that states are increasingly beginning to
include goals of environmental protection and sustainable
development in the preambles of BITs; this is especially true of the
past decade. For example, a BIT between the United States and
Rwanda from 2008 states that the goals of economic development
should be “achieve[d] . . . in a manner consistent with the protection
of health, safety, and the environment, and the promotion of
internationally recognized labor rights.”36 In 2013, Canada and
Benin entered into a BIT that “[r]ecogniz[ed] that the promotion and
the protection of investments of investors . . . [is] conducive to the
stimulation of mutually beneficial economic activity, the
development of economic cooperation between both countries and
the promotion of sustainable development.”37 And a BIT between
Canada and China specified that that investment should be “based
on the principles of sustainable development.”38

Id.
Id.
36
Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment, Rwanda-U.S., preamble, Feb. 19, 2008, T.I.A.S. No. 12-101.
37
Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Benin-Can., preamble, Jan. 9, 2013.
38
Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Can.-China, preamble, Sept. 9, 2012.
34
35
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3.2. Explicit Exceptions
BITs sometimes give states more explicit direction in their
substantive provisions that discuss environmental policy-making.
For example, many BITs entered into by the U.S. in the recent past
provide that “[n]othing in [the] Treaty shall be construed to prevent
a Party from adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any measure
otherwise consistent with [the] Treaty that it considers appropriate
to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a
manner sensitive to environmental concerns.”39 Canada’s Model
BIT from 2004 carves out exceptions similar to those in Article XX of
the GATT:
[N]othing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a
Party from adopting or enforcing measures necessary: (a) to
protect human, animal or plant life or health; (b) to ensure
compliance with laws and regulations that are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement; or (c) for
the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural
resources.40
Many BITs specify that the promotion of investment cannot
simultaneously result in compromising environmental standards.
The effect of these provisions is that they enlarge the scope of a
State’s regulatory sphere by expressly declaring that states can
adopt or monitor their environmental laws as they see fit. Both the
U.S. and Canadian Model BITs provide for this kind of provision.41
A 2006 BIT between Belgium, the Luxembourg Economic Union,
and Mozambique is a notable example of a BIT that includes this
kind of strong provision. The BIT provides:
1. Recognizing the right of each Contracting Party to
establish its own levels of domestic environmental
39
2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 12(5) [hereinafter U.S.
Model
BIT],
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.p
df [https://perma.cc/H2UM-SC2R].
40
2004 Canada Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 10(1) [hereinafter
Canadian Model BIT], https://www.italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004FIPA-model-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UYG-5UBW].
41 See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 39, art. 12(2) (discouraging weakening
domestic environmental protections in order to encourage investment); Canadian
Model BIT, supra note 40, art. 11 (similarly discouraging relaxing environmental
protections in order to encourage investment).
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protection and environmental development policies and
priorities, and to adopt or modify accordingly its
environmental laws, each Contracting Party shall strive to
continue to improve those laws . . .
3. The Contracting Parties reaffirm their commitments
under the international environmental agreements, which
they have accepted. They shall strive to ensure that such
commitments are fully recognized and implemented by their
domestic laws.42These provisions could also be relevant in
cases where new scientific evidence has emerged since the
parties have entered into the BIT. In these cases, the state
may have a duty to heed the overwhelming scientific
consensus, especially if other states are taking on new
obligations. The failure to keep up with standards in
environmental law may inadvertently and unfairly lead to
competitive advantages that benefit states who have not
adopted more stringent environmental provisions to the
detriment of the more environmentally progressive states.
Thus, provisions that allow states, or even obligate them, to
prioritize new international environmental agreements and
standards are important because they reduce the perverse
incentive for states to delay the enactment of new
environmental provisions in hopes of becoming
comparatively more competitive in attracting foreign
investment.
4. STANDARDS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Preambular provisions and explicit exceptions may deflate the
likelihood of investor recovery in some cases, but they do not shield
states from all investor claims. It is essential to bear in mind
standards that are foundational to international investment, and
evaluate investor claims on a case by case basis. Although standards
like most favored nation and national treatment are important in
investment, the standards that are most relevant to investment in
relation to environmental conservation and policy-making are fair

42
Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments,
Belg.-Lux. Econ. Union-Mozam., art. 7, July 18, 2006.
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These two

4.1. Fair and Equitable Treatment
The FET standard in international investment law is an
obligation for States to treat investors fairly; it is intended to protect
investors from discriminatory or arbitrary conduct.43 FET is an
absolute minimum standard by which the host state promises to
treat investors in accordance with international law.44 FET includes
the obligations of providing a stable and predictable environment,
the protection of legitimate expectations, substantive and
administrative due process, transparency, reasonableness, and
proportionality in relation to host states’ governmental actions.45 A
violation of FET does not always require bad faith on the part of the
host state; investors may be able to claim damages if the host state is
acting in an improper or unreasonable way.46 Arbitral tribunals
have awarded damages in a variety of circumstances, such as cases
where the State changed its tax rates,47 where the State has refused
to modify its gas tariff rates and transferred the rights to another
public utility service during a financial crisis,48 or where a State
failed to issue municipal landfill permits.49 Some scholars say that
governmental actions likely violate FET if specific representations,
assurances, or contractual obligations are violated, or if legislative
changes are accompanied by procedural deficiencies.50

43
Azernoosh Bazrafkan & Alexia Herwig, Reinterpreting the Fair and Equitable
Treatment Provision in International Investment Agreements as a New and More
Legitimate Way to Manage Risks, 7 EUR. J. RISK REG. 439, 441 (2016).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Occidental v. Ecuador (UNCITRAL/LCIA Case No. UN3467, Final Award, 1
July 2004), paras. 85, 92.
48 Suez et al. v. Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability,
30 July 2010), para. 226 [hereinafter Suez v. Argentina].
49 Metalclad v. Mexico (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, Aug. 30, 2000),
paras. 103–107 [hereinafter Metalclad].
50
Bazrafkan et al., supra note 43, at 442.
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4.1(a). Suez et al. v. Argentina
In the case of Suez et al. v. Argentina, the Argentine government
privatized the country’s public services because of the deterioration
of the water and sewage quality and the inability of the service to
reach all inhabitants of the city of Buenos Aires.51 At the same time,
Argentina was beginning to get mired in financial troubles. During
the financial crisis in 2000, the government de-linked the Argentine
peso from the U.S. dollar, majorly devaluing the currency.52 This
caused the Claimants’ costs for providing the services to rise, but the
government refused to modify the tariff rates they were allowed to
collect to cushion the setbacks in profits.53 Consequently, investors
were not able to earn a reasonable rate of return and the company
was not able to continue investment in service improvements,
leading to suspect levels of nitrate in the water.54 Concerned with
water quality, the government transferred the water management
company to another entity (one owned by the Argentine
government) without allowing the Claimants time to remedy the
situation.55 Although the Tribunal did not find that the government
expropriated the Claimant’s company in this case, it did find that
the investor’s legitimate expectations were frustrated, and thus
ruled that Argentina violated the fair and equitable treatment
standard.56
The result of Suez et al. v. Argentina is hardly surprising,
especially given that the government’s decision-making was not
clearly motivated by strong environmental interests. Although one
reason for the government’s decision to transfer ownership from the
Claimant to another entity was its dissatisfaction and concern with
the water quality,57 it is likely that the greater motivation was the
unraveling of the country’s financial stability. Concern with
financial stability in turn led to restructuring of the currency peg that
forced the Claimants into financial ruin, preventing them from
providing quality services to inhabitants of the area. It is possible
Suez v. Argentina, supra note 48, paras. 26–29.
Id. para. 44 (discussing the Argentine government’s actions during the 2000
financial crisis).
53 Id. para. 50 (discussing the results in Suez v. Argentina).
54 Id. paras. 55–56.
55 Id. para. 56.
56 Id. para. 226.
57 Id. para. 56.
51
52
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that the result would differ had the government’s environmental
concerns been at the forefront of their decision-making. It seems,
then, that in cases where concern for the environment is a
justification for a measure taken by a state, a tribunal will more
likely dismiss investor claims if the environmental justification is at
the center of the state’s decision-making.
4.1(b). Renewable Energy in Spain
While arbitral cases in which investors claim losses due to the
negative impact that new environmental regulations have on their
investments are fairly common, cases in which investors are harmed
due to a state revoking laws and regulations that actually positively
affect the environment are quite rare. In these cases, tribunals,
especially more progressive tribunals seeking to promote
environmentally conscious policies, may be faced with unique
challenges in their decision-making: should the tribunal award
compensation to investors in hopes of stressing the importance of
the now-defunct environmental policies, or should the tribunal
“maintain[] the State’s sovereign ability to revoke support systems
as it sees fit?”58 Spain’s recent withdrawal of substantial support for
renewable energy poses this conundrum.
In the mid-1990s, Spain sought to take advantage of its abundant
sunshine and windy Northern regions59 by implementing a feed-in
tariff60 scheme that sought to encourage investors to participate in
58
Rachel A. Nathanson, The Revocation of Clean-Energy Investment EconomicSupport Systems as Indirect Expropriation Post-Nykomb: A Spanish Case Analysis, 98
Iowa L. Rev. 863, 902 (2013).
59 See
A
Guide
to
the
Winds
of
Spain,
SPAIN
GUIDES,
https://spainguides.com/weather/winds-spain/
[https://perma.cc/S66AVSCV] (listing the many terms the Spanish use for wind and commenting on the
importance of wind as a part of Spain’s energy generation portfolio); see also Climate
LANDED,
in
Spain,
JUST
https://www.justlanded.com/english/Spain/Articles/Culture/Climate-in-Spain
[https://perma.cc/3PZW-FQJL] (noting that Spain has roughly 300 days of
sunshine per year and strong winds with sustained speeds of up to 200km/h in the
northern regions of the country).
60 See Toby Couture & Yves Gagnon, An Analysis of Feed-in Tariff Remuneration
Models: Implications for Renewable Energy Investment, 38 ENERGY POLICY 955, 955
(2010) (noting that feed-in tariffs offer investors guaranteed prices over a fixed
period of time for production of renewable energy, and asserting that this scheme
reduces investment risk by “enabl[ing] investors to be remunerated according to
the actual costs of [renewable energy] project development”).
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the precursor to the clean energy revolution.61 The purpose of the
feed-in tariffs was to stimulate investment by assuring ease of
market entry and a high purchase price for all developers, both large
and small.62 However, Spanish laws prohibited utilities from
passing on these high rates to consumers,63 so the government
provided large subsidies to offset the utilities’ internalized costs.64
By 2012, the Spanish government had given out over 8.1 billion
euros in subsidies to all renewables, leading to a massive tariff
deficit65 accounting for 3% of Spanish GDP: this contributed to
Spain’s serious financial crisis in 2008. 66 To manage debt that was
spiraling out of control, Spain passed a law that retroactively cut
subsidies.67
Investors in renewable energy projects are understandably
frustrated, as these retroactive measures are less about achieving
61 See generally Feed-in Tariffs, International Energy Agency (May 2, 2017),
https://www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/pams/spain/name-21057-en.php
[https://perma.cc/FHC6-MBP2] (detailing the assistance offered to renewable
energy sources by Royal Decrees in the form of feed-in tariffs); see also Feed-In Tariffs:
A
Brief
History,
Building
Efficiency
Initiative
(Aug.
5,
2010),
http://www.buildingefficiencyinitiative.org/articles/feed-tariffs-brief-history
[https://perma.cc/96XH-GDL2] (profiling the history of feed-in tariffs and how
they have historically been used to improve the competitiveness of nascent
renewable energy sources in the market).
62
Paul Noothout, et al., Report, The Impact of Risks in Renewable Energy
Investment and the Role of Smart Policies, DiaCore 19 (2016).
63 Spain Halts Feed-In-Tariffs for Renewable Energy, INST. FOR ENERGY RES. (Apr.
9, 2012), http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/spain-halts-feed-intariffs-for-renewable-energy/ [https://perma.cc/J862-JZYC].
64 The
cost
del
sol,
ECONOMIST
(July
20,
2013),
https://www.economist.com/news/business/21582018-sustainable-energymeets-unsustainable-costs-cost-del-sol [https://perma.cc/Z6TH-7Z2X].
65
The tariff deficit is now over 24 billion euros. Spain Halts Feed-In-Tariffs for
Renewable Energy, supra note 63; Securitisation of the electricity tariff deficit, INT’L. FIN.
L. REV. (June 3, 2010), http://www.iflr.com/Article/2584079/Securitisation-of-theelectricity-tariff-deficit.html [https://perma.cc/6P77-VLFW].
66 The cost del sol, supra note 64.
67
Real Decreto-ley (R.D.) 2/2013, de 2 de febrero, De Medidas Urgentes en el
Sistema Eléctrico y en el Sector Financier, BOE-A-2013-1117. See Michael
McGovern, Spain passes retroactive subsidy cut law, WIND POWER (June 14, 2014),
https://www.windpowermonthly.com/article/1298015/spain-passesretroactive-subsidy-cut-law [https://perma.cc/T9U9-8NNP] (announcing the
Spanish government’s passage of a decree that would retroactively cut incentives
provided to renewable energy); see also Arjun Mahalingam & David M. Reiner,
Energy Subsidies at Times of Economic Crisis: A Comparative Study and Scenario Analysis
of Italy and Spain (Energy Policy Research Group Working Paper, University of
Cambridge 2016) (discussing the approaches that both Italy and Spain took with
respect to the costs of renewable energy incentives during the Global Financial
Crisis).
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environmental goals than they are reflective of Spain’s poor
financial planning. Distraught investors are bringing FET claims in
Spain’s highest courts and in arbitral tribunals, claiming that Spain
has violated obligations under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)
which governs these agreements.68 There are arguments, albeit
weak ones, that Spain’s measures could be protected under either
Article 24(2)(b)(i) of the ECT, which gives governments space to
enact measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health,69 or Article 24(3)(c), which allows states to enact measures
necessary for the maintenance of the public order.70 The retroactive
subsidy cuts could be seen as protecting human life and health
under Article 24(2)(b)(i) if one assumes that a financial crisis
resulting from a government’s large debt would prevent the
government from providing crucial public services (such as
healthcare) in order to first service non-essential spending on
promises made to foreign investors. It is also possible that these
cost-costing measures could be justified as a means to keep public
discontent over the state’s finances at bay under Article 24(3)(c), if
the government has reason to believe that this discontent could
somehow negatively affect the functioning of the State.
These arguments, however, are tangential at best, and it is
obvious that Spain’s motives stemmed not from concern for public
health, but because the government realized just how unsustainable
its subsidy program was. Thus far, investors have had more luck
recovering damages in arbitration than in domestic courts: the
Spanish Supreme Court is standing by the government’s debt
management strategy and ruled in 2016 that the retroactive subsidy
cuts were constitutional.71 Investors have had better luck in the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID). In 2017, ICSID found that Spain violated the fair and
equitable treatment standard, thus violating Article 10 of the Energy
68 See generally The Energy Charter Treaty, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY CHARTER,
Energy
Charter
Treaty,
Dec.
17,
1994,
2080
U.N.T.S.
95.,
https://energycharter.org/process/energy-charter-treaty-1994/energy-chartertreaty/ [https://perma.cc/F5V2-BKJZ] (describing the Energy Charter Treaty as a
legally binding document that focuses on protecting foreign investments against
key non-commercial risks, amongst other areas).
69 Id. art. 24(2)(b)(i).
70 Id. art. 24(3)(c).
71
Reyes Rincón, Spain’s Supreme Court backs renewable energy cuts, EL PAÍS (June
2,
2016),
https://elpais.com/elpais/2016/06/02/inenglish/1464860925_523010.html
[https://perma.cc/9YKG-87NT].
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Charter Treaty, and awarded the claimants 128 million euros in
compensatory damages.72 A year later, in May 201873 and June
201874, ICSID once again found that Spain violated the standard of
fair and equitable treatment and ruled in favor of investors.
A plausible interpretation of these rulings is that ICSID sees the
value in encouraging the proliferation of clean energy and seeks to
promote a host state’s policy-making targeted in that direction. By
ordering compensation for investor losses, ICSID may be signaling
that revoking environmental benefits should be avoided, even if a
state finds itself in a precarious budgetary dilemma. In this way,
ICSID may be trying to prevent aversion for further investment in
renewables or other environmentally sound policies, especially in
the particular host state.75 The results of these arbitral cases, then,
may have important implications for environmental law-making in
the future, as these results indicate that fulfilling investor
expectations, especially in relation to environmental incentives, is
crucial if the goal is to increase innovation and investment in
renewable energy.
4.2. Expropriation
Foreign investors may also bring claims in arbitral tribunals
based on expropriation, which can be generally defined as the
72 See Miguel Ángel Noceda, Spain loses first arbitration claim over energy
subsidies,
EL
PAÍS
(May
5,
2017),
https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/05/05/inenglish/1493988308_857826.html
[https://perma.cc/5ADD-KFQ5] (discussing instances of investors winning in
arbitration claims).
73
Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID
Case No. ARB/14/1; Trishna Menon, ICSID Tribunal Finds Spain in Breach of the FET
Standard Under the Energy Charter Treaty, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (July 30,
2018),
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2018/07/30/icsid-tribunal-finds-spain-inbreach-of-the-fet-standard-under-the-energy-charter-treaty-masdar-solar-windcooperatief-ua-v-kingdom-spain-icsid-trishna-menon/ [https://perma.cc/P8J6SGMY].
74
Antin Infrastructure Services Luxembourg S.à.r.l. and Antin Energia
Termosolar B.V. v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/31; Trishna
Menon, Spain Found to Have Breached the Energy Charter Treaty in Award by ICSID
Tribunal,
INT’L
INST.
FOR
SUSTAINABLE
DEV.
(Oct.
17,
2018),
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2018/10/17/spain-found-to-have-breached-theenergy-charter-treaty-in-award-by-icsid-tribunal-trishna-menon/
[https://perma.cc/7XVB-GPWC].
75
Nathanson, supra note 58, at 902–903.
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confiscation of property by a state.76 Protection from expropriation
can be found in BITs, multilateral agreements, and international
investment agreements: in most cases, these provisions are similarly
drafted. For the purposes of this paper, the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) will be used as an example of a
multilateral agreement containing such a provision.
Protection from expropriation can be found in Article 1110 of
NAFTA.77 This provision specifies that governments cannot
nationalize or expropriate any investment except for a public
purpose, on a non-discriminatory basis, in accordance with due
process of law and international law, and on payment of fair
compensation.78 Expropriation need not be outright and deliberate;
instead, veiled interference with the use of property that deprives
the owner, at least in significant part, of the reasonably expected
economic benefit is also expropriation, albeit indirect
expropriation.79 Cases have shown that in assessing expropriation
claims, tribunals will often consider three main factors: (1) the extent
of the interference; (2) the reasonableness of the investors’ legitimate
expectations; and (3) the character and purpose of the measure.80
The greater the interference with the investment, the more likely it
is that a tribunal will find that the state is in violation of its
obligations.81 NAFTA requires governments to treat arbitration
awards as binding.82
While the treaty provides ample protections for investors, it also
recognizes the importance of environmentalism. The Preamble
states that Parties should endeavor to achieve treaty goals “in a
manner consistent with environmental protection and
conservation,” to “promote sustainable development,” and to
“strengthen the development and enforcement of environmental

76 See
J. Martin Wagner, International Investment, Expropriation and
Environmental Protection, 29 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 465, 465 (1999) (discussing ways
in which foreign investors can bring claims in arbitral tribunals based on
expropriation).
77
North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992,
chapter 11, 32 I.L.M. 638 [hereinafter NAFTA].
78 Id.
79
Metalclad, supra note 49, para. 103.
80
Moloo et al., supra note 3, at 24.
81 Id.
82
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals
of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 194, art. 54(1).
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laws and regulations.”83 NAFTA also includes provisions regarding
the environment in its investment chapter. Article 1114 specifies
that nothing in the agreement prevents Parties from “adopting,
maintaining, or enforcing any measure [ . . . ] that it considers
appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is
undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns.”84 The
same provision also details that Parties cannot relax domestic health,
safety, or environmental measures to encourage investment.85
Furthermore, NAFTA specifically carves out exceptions for
environmental protection by borrowing the language enshrined in
GATT Articles XX(b) and XX(g)86 which detail instances in which
parties may be exempt from WTO rules in pursuit of their
environmental goals.87 Parties that believe that other members have
relaxed their environmental standards to attract investment are not
powerless and may seek consultations with the other Party to
remedy the issue.88
NAFTA’s goals to increase free trade without compromising
environmental quality do sometimes result in tension. Because
increased trade and investment often result in environmental
degradation, states must often make compromises between forging
favorable investment climates and protecting the environment. In
justifying regulations that promote environmental health but harm
investors, states often refer to the “polluter pays principle,” a key
tenet of international environmental law implied in the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development that states that those
responsible for environmental harm must also bear the cost of
protecting the environment.89 This principle can be interpreted to
mean that states can shift the burden of protecting the environment
on those who directly harm it: the investors that engage in pollution
of other environmental harm through the normal operation of their
investments. Notwithstanding this principle, states are not free to
shift all costs of environmental protections on investors and are still
NAFTA, supra note 77, preamble.
Id. art. 1114.
85 Id.
86 Id. art. 2101.1.
87 See note 9 and accompanying text for discussion of articles XX(b), XX(g), and
the chapeau. GATT, supra note 8, art. XX(b), art. XX(g).
88
NAFTA, supra note 77, art. 1114.2.
89
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.I51/26/rev.1 (Vol. 1), annex 1
(Aug. 12, 1992).
83
84
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subject to expropriation claims. Even if governmental measures that
shift burdens are necessary to protect human and animal life and
health, investors may bring claims of expropriation when their
property is confiscated, either partially or fully. For the most part,
however, international law specifies that a “State is not liable for
economic injury which is a consequence of bona fide ‘regulation’
within the accepted police power of states,”90 so regulations seen as
essential to state function, such as anti-trust, environmental
protection, and land planning, are outside the scope of
categorization as takings.91 As long as the actions leading to indirect
expropriation bear are “reasonable,” tribunals will generally
disallow compensation for expropriation claims. Some scholars go
further, however, and feel that protective measures should not be
subject to expropriation claims in all but the most extreme
circumstances.92 They argue that allowing actionable claims to arise
from legitimate environmental measures and forcing the
government to provide compensation results in a undesirable
externality: instead of making the “polluter pay” for their
wrongdoing, this shifts the cost of environmental harm onto the
innocent general public.93
Determining whether a governmental regulation amounts to
expropriation and is thereby compensable is made more difficult if
the expropriation is indirect rather than direct. It is easier for courts
and arbitral tribunals to decide whether an expropriation is
compensable in the latter case. Although there is no codified
standard to guide courts and tribunals in determining what qualifies
as indirect expropriation and what falls short, common themes are
emerging for general considerations. One of these criteria is the
effect of the measure on the owner.94 Measures may be seen as
indirect expropriation if they result “[ . . . ] in the effective loss of
management, use or control, or a significant depreciation of the
value, of the assets of a foreign investor.”95 Tribunals sometimes
90
Sedco, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co., Interlocutory Award, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl.
Trib. Rep. 248, 275 (1985).
91
Wagner, supra note 76, at 517.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 528.
94
Rudolf Dolzer, Indirect Expropriations: New Development, 11 N.Y.U. ENVT’L L.
J. 64, 79 (2002).
95
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Series on Issues in
International Investment Agreements: Takings of Property, U.N. Doc
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/15, at 2 (2000).
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refuse to consider a government’s intent in its policy-making, and
merely consider the effect of the measure;96 this is called the “sole
effect doctrine.”97 In cases where courts eschew applying the sole
effect doctrine, they also consider the measure’s character and
purpose.98 Here, the government’s intent is important; courts will
rarely find that bona fide policy-making, if applied generally, does
not fall within the state’s police powers and amounts to indirect
expropriation.99
4.2(a). Metalclad v. Mexico
A notable and foundational example of a tribunal’s deferral to
investor interests is the case of Metalclad v. Mexico, in which the
Tribunal found that the government of Mexico violated both the
standards of fair and equitable treatment and indirect
expropriation.100 In Metalclad, the municipality in question denied a
local construction permit because of its conviction that granting it
would cause the landfill to fill with hazardous waste that would
have a negative impact on the water quality and environment.101
The denial of the permits was not baseless: environmental experts,
geologists, and local citizens were skeptical of the environmental
impact assessment completed by Metalclad that was required by the
government.102 In light of reports from geologists that stated the
landfill could poison the local water supply, the Governor decided
to shut down the landfill.103 Notwithstanding these environmental
assessments, the Tribunal found that the municipality was acting
outside its authority and that the refusal to grant the permits was
unfounded.104 The Tribunal also took issue with the Ecological
Decree, an official order by the Governor that created an ecological
preserve that included the landfill site.105 This Decree essentially
Metalclad, supra note 49, para. 111.
Dolzer, supra note 94, at 79–80.
98
Moloo et al., supra note 3, at 15.
99 Id. at 16.
100
Metalclad, supra note 49, para. 104.
101 Id. para. 106.
102 Trying to Give the NACEC Teeth, in LATIN AMERICAN REGIONAL REPORTS:
MEXICO AND NAFTA REPORTS at 4 (May 9, 1996) in Wagner, supra note 76, at 489.
103
Metalclad, supra note 49, para. 59.
104 Id. para. 107.
105 Id. para. 109.
96
97
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had the effect of forever barring the operation of the landfill; the
Tribunal did not take the Government’s arguments to the contrary
seriously.106 It decided that the Government’s motivation for
passing this measure was irrelevant to the claim, and that although
a finding that the Ecological Decree was expropriation was not
necessary to find that the government violated NAFTA Article 1110,
the implementation of the Decree amounted to expropriation.107 In
coming to this conclusion, the Tribunal utilized the sole effect
doctrine and considered only the effect of the measure on the
investor, without taking into account the government’s motivations
or intent.108 These facts, combined with Metalclad’s reasonable
reliance on the representations of the Mexican government, led the
Tribunal to decide in favor of the investor.109
4.2(b). The Chemtura and Bilcon Cases
Recent investment claims challenging environmental
regulations have been less successful than early ones such as
Metalclad,110 exemplifying that tribunals are beginning to take
environmental measures and states’ justifications for enacting them
more seriously. In a significant case from 2010 involving a U.S.based chemical manufacturer claiming that Canada violated its
treaty obligations by banning an agro-chemical called lindane,111 the
Tribunal rejected the Claimant’s arguments requesting
compensation for expropriation and breach of FET.112 The Tribunal
unanimously decided that the environmental measures taken by
Canada were a valid use of their police powers, in part because the
acts were “[ . . . ] motivated by the increasing awareness of the
dangers presented by lindane for human health and the
environment.”113

Id. paras. 109–111.
Id.
108 Id. para. 111.
109 Id. para. 107.
110
Moloo et al., supra note 3, at 1.
111
Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, Final Award, NAFTA/UNCITRAL paras. 11–
14 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2010).
112 Id. paras. 92–96.
113 Id. para 266.
106
107
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Nonetheless, steps forward are also countered with steps back.
In the 2015 Bilcon, the Canadian government rejected investors’
project proposals to construct and operate a quarry114 amongst
criticism from the community concerned about the quality of the
environment and quality of life were the quarry to be constructed,
and an unfavorable report detailing the detrimental impact to the
environment.115 The Tribunal agreed with the investor’ arguments
that the government violated their legitimate expectations for profit
because it found that the government made specific assurances that
were disappointed.116 On the other hand, the dissent argued that the
Tribunal’s dismissal and misunderstanding of the substance, and of
the importance, of the community’s “core values,” (the historic
preservation of the use of the area by the Aboriginal people, fishing,
quality of life, a high quality of air and water, and a sense of
community and heritage), was unwarranted.117 The dissent
lamented the implications of this decision, stating that “ . . . the
decision [ . . . ] will be seen as a remarkable step backwards in
environmental protection.”118 This case elucidates the prominent
influence of corporate interests on environmental policy-making,
and the lack of respect for, or recognition of, the legitimacy of
concern regarding the deterioration of community values. The
Bilcon case highlights the importance of backing up sincere concerns
for quality of life with real scientific evidence or rigorous studies
showing a significant detrimental effect.
5. FET AND EXPROPRIATION CLAIM ASSESSMENT
Although assessments of expropriation and FET claims involve
the use of different tests, it may be useful to think about state
wrongdoing in a somewhat more abstract sense that combines
elements of both evaluative standards. When assessing a claim,
tribunals must decide whether the environmental justifications
underlying governmental regulations were legitimate. They must
114
Bilcon Inc. v. Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Final Award, para. 5 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 2015).
115 Id. paras. 162–163, 219.
116 Id. paras. 447–448.
117
Bilcon Inc. v. Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Dissent, para. 23 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 2015).
118 Id. para. 51.
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look to see that they are objectively, scientifically backed, and that
the measure is not merely a veiled attempt at protectionism or a
political play.119 States should also take care to comply with
requirements to conduct risk assessments or cost-benefit
evaluations.120 Even though many agreements do not require risk
assessments, doing so can add credence to the state’s claim that their
measures are backed by objective scientific evidence.
Specific commitments and assurances made to investors
complicate this analysis: if specific commitments are made to an
investor and the state knowingly regulates against those assurances,
their actions may not be legitimate. In this case, even objective
evidence of the validity of the environmental concern may not be
enough to shield government actions.121 Regardless of whether
specific promises were made or not, tribunals should take care to
evaluate the specific facts of the case. If the time elapsed between
the specific assurances and the measure is long enough, tribunals
may find the specific assurance less central to their determination.
Tribunals should look at both current standards of international
environmental law and the state of knowledge at the time the
specific assurance was made and the time the regulation went into
effect. If new scientific discoveries have been made in the interim,
tribunal may find that the regulation was legitimate and that the
harm may not be compensable.122
A tribunal’s assessment does not end at the finding that the
regulation was legitimate, however; it must next consider whether
the measure is proportionate to its aim.123 When determining
compensation, the tribunal must engage in balancing: citizens
should not bear the entire cost of regulations as a result of new
scientific discoveries in the environmental sphere, but investors
should not have to bear all the risk associated with new and often
unpredictable discoveries.124 Inherent in balancing interests is the
need to determine whether the investor’s expectations were
legitimate. Scholars suggest that tribunals should adopt a simple
distinction to allot an appropriate amount of political risk to
Id. para. 33.
Id. para. 54.
121 Id.
122 Id. para. 33. An accepted principle of international law is that a state may
be excused from its obligations if it encounters certain unforeseen and fundamental
changes in circumstances. See generally, Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, supra note 22.
123
Moloo et al., supra note 3, at 1.
124 Id. 35.
119
120
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investors, namely that investors be compensated when specific
assurances are made but not compensated when assurances of this
nature are not made.125 Although this distinction is helpful,
investors should nonetheless be able to make a showing why the
government’s act was disproportionate and tribunals should
carefully attempt to balance interests in these determinations.126
Some cases suggest that a proportionality analysis must include
a determination of whether the measure adopted was least
restrictive with trade or investment. In the NAFTA dispute of S.D.
Meyers, the Canadian government banned the export of a hazardous
chemical compound called polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB),
effectively eliminating the Claimant’s purpose for investing in
Canada.127 Canada asserted that the ban was necessary to protect
human life and health and the environment, because exportation
without the assurance that the PCBs would be correctly disposed of
poses a significant threat to the environment.128 The Tribunal found
that Canada violated the minimum standard of treatment,129 and
that it was obligated to adopt an alternative that was least restrictive
to trade.130 Scholars argue that in interpreting case law arising out
of WTO agreements, the Tribunal adopted too restrictive of a
standard that cannot be read into the text of the NAFTA or GATT
and that an evaluation of the proportionality of the measure is
sufficient.131
The precautionary principle is also relevant to the
proportionality analysis. If the potential risk is grave enough and
the potential effects detrimental enough, a state may be able to make
the case that their regulations are still appropriate, even though no
actual harm has yet been suffered.132 Tribunals should also consider
whether there were any serious procedural deficiencies that further
harmed the investor.133 States can ensure that their actions are
procedurally fair by ensuring that they are transparent, consistent,

Id.
Id. at 36.
127
S.D. Meyers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Partial
Award, para. 100 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2000).
128 Id. para. 152.
129 Id. para. 268.
130 Id. para. 221.
131
Moloo et al., supra note 3, at 36.
132 Id. at 55.
133 Id. at 54.
125
126
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and provide investors with procedural fairness in governmental
regulating.134
6. CONCLUSION
As consensus that environmental conversation is a necessity
grows, tribunals will likely defer to states in their environmental
policy-making at a higher rate. In order to expand their regulatory
spheres and increase the likelihood of favorable results, states
should be sure to include provisions that carve out exceptions for
environmental policy-making in their BITs. Further, states should
include the centrality of environmentalism and sustainable
development to their national priorities in preambular provisions,
which may help guide the interpretation of exceptions included
further in the treaty. Cases have shown that states have the greatest
success in justifying environmental regulations when the reasons
behind the policy-making are based on objective, scientific evidence
instead of merely aspirational concerns for the well-being of the
inhabitants or environment. Substantively fair and legitimate
policy-making is not enough to stand the tests of arbitral tribunals,
however; states must not forget that providing a stable investment
environment also involves according administrative due process
and upholding a high level of transparency. By holding themselves
to high standards of policy-making, states will be able to fairly
allocate the cost of environmentalism between their citizens and
investors and build trusting relationships with current and future
investors, ensuring both a flourishing investment environment and
a path to sustainable development.
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